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TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This Article reviews Texas conflicts cases from Texas
state and federal courts during the Survey period from October 1, 2004
through November 31, 2005. The Article excludes cases involving fed-
eral-state conflicts, intrastate issues such as subject-matter jurisdiction
and venue, and conflicts in time such as the applicability of prior or sub-
sequent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state law topic except for a few consti-
tutional limits, resulting in the same rules applying to most issues in state
and federal courts.'
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court offered only two
significant opinions: the first limited Texas jurisdiction for claims by Texas
residents against nonresident vendors for products bought out of state,
2
and the second reaffirmed the requirement that trial courts conduct rigor-
ous choice-of-law analyses before certifying multi-state or nationwide
class actions.3 Overall, the Survey period saw continued growth in forum
contests, a record number of choice of law decisions, and a static number
of judgment enforcements. Insurance-coverage disputes were prominent
this year, including an impressive analysis by a Houston federal court in
an Enron-related case.4 Other cases of interest include the dismissal, on
parallel-litigation grounds, of the largest bankruptcy ever filed in the
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice-of-law questions, see
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001).
2. See infra notes 20-25 and surrounding text (discussing Michiana Easy Livin' Coun-
try, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005)).
3. See infra notes 186-88 and surrounding text (discussing Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v.
Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2005)).
4. See infra notes 170-75 and surrounding text (discussing In re Enron Corp. Sec.
Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 391 F. Supp. 2d 841 (S.D. Tex. 2005)).
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United States;5 a rare rejection of in rem jurisdiction on minimum-con-
tacts grounds;6 and a good analysis of multiple forum clauses in badly
drafted joint venture agreements. 7
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on a contract's forum-selection
clause), waiver (failing to give a timely objection), or extraterritorial ser-
vice of process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects of
notice are purely matters of forum law, this Article will focus primarily on
the issues relating to amenability.
A. PRESENCE
This Survey period's most unusual case was decided in the prior Survey
year but was not released for publication until recently. HMS Aviation v.
Layale Enterprises, S.A. 8 is a rare example of an in rem case that fails
under a minimum-contacts analysis. Defendant HMS, an unincorporated
Jordanian entity with offices in London, England and Amman, Jordan,
leased a Boeing 727 airplane from two members of the Jordanian royal
family. Upon leasing the plane, HMS flew it to Meacham Field in Fort
Worth for repairs. While the plane was in Fort Worth, Layale filed an in
rem action against HMS for a conversion that occurred in Jordan. HMS
objected to personal jurisdiction on several grounds, lost in the trial court,
and appealed. HMS then removed the case to federal court. The re-
ported opinion does not discuss the federal proceedings except that the
federal court remanded the case to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals for
review of the trial court's ruling that HMS was subject to Texas
jurisdiction. 9
The court of appeals quickly rejected three arguments for jurisdiction:
1) specific jurisdiction because HMS's alleged conversion of the plane
would have occurred in Jordan; 2) general jurisdiction because HMS had
an extremely low level of contacts here; and 3) jurisdiction through a fo-
rum clause because it did not pertain to any agreement involving the
plaintiff.'0 In rem jurisdiction, however, was a more obvious basis for
jurisdiction because the airplane sat at Meacham Field. But in 1977, the
United States Supreme Court ruled in Shaffer v. Heitner that all asser-
tions of jurisdiction, including in rem, must satisfy the minimum-contacts
5. See infra notes 134-41 and surrounding text (discussing In re Yukos Oil Co., 321
B.R. 396 (S.D. Tex. 2005)).
6. See infra notes 8-12 and surrounding text (discussing HMS Aviation v. Layale En-
ters., 149 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.)).
7. See infra notes 111-16 and surrounding text (discussing Aerus L.L.C. v. Pro Team,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 304CV1985M, 2005 WL 1131093, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2005)).
8. HMS Aviation, 149 S.W.3d at 182.
9. Id. at 187-88.
10. Id. at 192-96.
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test." This claim did not. The court found that HMS met the first ele-
ment of the minimum-contacts test, minimal contact with Texas, because
the plane's location was in Texas. However, it failed the second part of
the test, the fair play and substantial justice balancing test, because the
plane's location was intended as temporary, it was unrelated to any deal-
ing with plaintiffs, a Texas forum would be burdensome for witnesses to
the underlying facts of the alleged conversion, and Texas had no interest
in litigating the claim.
12
B. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum-selection clause, which
designates either the optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration.
When a contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said
to be a prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction
over the defendant. When a contracting party sues in a non-selected fo-
rum in violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation
clause, that is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction. Only valid pro-
rogation clauses establish personal jurisdiction. Derogation clauses, on
the other hand, are grounds for the forum to decline otherwise valid juris-
diction.13 Both clauses are discussed in this section.
In this Survey period, only one unreported case considered a forum
clause with Texas as the designated forum, Ensco Offshore Co. v. Titan
Marine L.L.C.14 In this case, an oil-drilling rig was damaged by Hurri-
cane Ivan in 2004. Ensco owned the rig and contracted with Titan for
salvage operations. At some point, the parties disagreed, the relationship
broke down, and Ensco terminated the contract. Titan sought to enforce
the parties' choice of forum clause, which stated that "any dispute arising
out of this Agreement shall be referred to arbitration in London. 1 5 En-
sco then brought a declaratory-judgment action in a federal court in
Houston. The court agreed with Ensco, finding the arbitration clause un-
enforceable under a statute prohibiting enforcement if the agreement is
between two United States citizens and their commercial relationship has
no connection to the chosen forum. 16 The court also found, on similar
grounds, that English law did not govern the determination because it
lacked a reasonable relationship to the parties and the dispute.
1 7
11. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). See also HMS Aviation, 149 S.W.3d at 196.
12. HMS Aviation, 149 S.W.3d at 197-98.
13. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 340-42 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinaf-
ter SCOLES & HAY]; James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 912-41
(1999) [hereinafter Parallel Litigation]. For a discussion of forum-derogation clauses, see
infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
14. 370 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
15. Id. at 595.
16. Id. at 595-601 (citing the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C.A. § 202 (West 2005)).
17. Id. at 596-97 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(d) (Vernon 2005) (de-
fining "reasonable relationship" for choice-of-law clauses)).
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C. NONRESIDENTS' FORUM CONTACTS
Texas uses "limits of due process" long-arm statutes, meaning that the
minimum-contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal juris-
diction in Texas.18 The Texas long arms also apply in Texas federal
courts, unless Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute for fed-
eral-law claims. 19 In spite of due process's dominance, these personal-
jurisdiction cases are grouped under the long-arm categories.
1. The Texas Long Arm in Commercial Cases
This year's commercial cases in Texas state courts clarified jurisdic-
tional boundaries for out-of-state activities. In Michiana Easy Livin'
Country, Inc. v. Holten,20 the Texas Supreme Court reversed two lower
courts' findings of jurisdiction over a nonresident seller and clarified ju-
risdictional rules regarding out-of-state purchases. In this case, James
Holten purchased a $64,000 recreational vehicle from the defendant
seller in Indiana by telephone without seeing it first. Contrary to the
purchase agreement's designation of Indiana courts, Holten sued in a
Texas state court in Houston. Holten alleged that Michiana was subject
to Texas jurisdiction on two grounds: misrepresentations made during
telephone conversations with Holten at his Texas home and Michiana's
arrangements with a shipper to deliver the vehicle to Holten in Texas.
Both the trial court and court of appeals denied Michiana's special ap-
pearance. The supreme court quickly disposed of Holten's second argu-
ment based on Texas precedent. 21 Thus, the court focused its attention
on the first ground, whether Texas jurisdiction can be based on a nonresi-
dent seller's alleged misrepresentations by telephone. The supreme court
noted an appellate split within the state and resolved it in the defendant's
favor. First, the supreme court held that the due-process requirement of
purposeful availment was not met because the contact was the result of
Holten's unilateral action in contacting defendant, Michiana's Texas con-
tacts were more fortuitous than purposeful, and Michiana had not availed
itself of the benefits or advantages of Texas law. 22 Second, the supreme
court found that stream-of-commerce jurisdiction failed because, al-
though stream-of-commerce jurisdiction does not require actual contacts
18. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977). The primary
Texas long-arm statutes are found at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045
(Vernon 2005), and others are scattered throughout Texas statutes. See, e.g., TEX. AGRIC.
CODE ANN. § 161.132 (Vernon 2005) (violation of certain agricultural statutes); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 6.305 (Vernon 2005) (nonresident respondents in divorce actions); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 823.457 (Vernon 2005) (violations of duties imposed on insurance-holding
companies).
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (state long arms in federal court), and FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(1)(D) (federal long-arm statutes). Examples of federal long-arm statutes include
28 U.S.C.A. § 2361 (West 2005) for statutory interpleader and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West
1997) for claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
20. 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005).
21. Id. at 788 (citing CMMC v. Salinas, 929 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Tex. 1996)).
22. Id. at 785-87, 789-90.
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with the forum state, it is limited to nonresidents who direct their market-
ing or products at the forum state, which did not happen here.23 The
supreme court further noted that, while a single contact with a Texas resi-
dent may establish jurisdiction, it does not automatically do so. 24 Finally,
the supreme court held that the lower courts erred in focusing on the
concept that the defendant had directed a tort at Texas with its telephone
misrepresentations. Doing so, the supreme court concluded, improperly
focused on the relationship among the plaintiff, the forum, and the litiga-
tion rather than the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.
25
In Morris v. Kohls-York, 26 the Austin Court of Appeals upheld jurisdic-
tion in a negligence and breach-of-warranty action against a nonresident
veterinarian, an embryologist, and their corporation for the alleged use of
a contaminated microscope while implanting livestock embryos. The
court further rejected the defendants' claim of fiduciary shield-a doc-
trine immunizing nonresident corporate agents for acts done in Texas
solely on behalf of the corporation.
27
The opinion in Royal American Construction Co. v. Comerica Bank
28
mixed its terms, combining the concepts of general and specific jurisdic-
tion to find the latter over a Florida-based construction company that
ordered products from a Texas company. The court of appeals identified
specific jurisdiction as the foundation for jurisdiction and listed the Texas
contacts giving rise to the claim. However, it stated that "Royal has
maintained continuous and systematic contacts with Texas that constitute
a 'substantial connection' between Royal and Texas such that Royal
should reasonably anticipate being called into court in Texas." 29 This was
a harmless terminology error because the court cited ample facts to cre-
ate the minimal connection necessary for specific jurisdiction. Repeating
this erroneous analysis, however, could lead to a harmful error in subse-
quent cases.
Stein v. Deason30 presents an interesting and valid stretch of the Texas
long arm. Texas resident Deason hired California resident Stein as a de-
signer for Deason's residential construction project in California. Dea-
son's decision to hire Stein was based in part on Stein's representation
that he was a licensed architect, made when Stein visited Texas to confer
on the project. When Deason subsequently had to hire other architects
to conclude the project, he learned that Stein was not licensed. Deason
23. Id. The supreme court further held that stream-of-commerce jurisdiction required
a stream and not a dribble, and thus did not apply to Michiana's meager Texas sales. Id. at
786 (citing CMMC, 929 S.W.2d at 439).
24. Id. at 786-87.
25. Id. at 790-92. The supreme court also upheld the parties' agreement to litigate in
Indiana. Id. at 793.
26. 164 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. dism'd).
27. Id. at 689-94, 696-97.
28. 164 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
29. Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
30. 165 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
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sued in Texas, the trial court rejected Stein's special appearance, and the
court of appeals affirmed.
31
In other commercial cases, Texas state courts upheld specific jurisdic-
tion in (1) a fraud action by the Texas Insurance Commissioner's special
deputy against nonresident health insurers and their agents; 32 (2) a radio
station seller's claim against nonresident lawyers over legal advice given
to their client, the nonresident buyer;33 (3) a default judgment against
three Georgia defendants in the sale of a truck, in which there was no
indication of where the transaction was to occur; 34 (4) a Texas securities
action against a California investment company;35 (5) a trademark-in-
fringement action against Florida companies regarding hair and beauty
products, which included a finding of jurisdiction based on alter ego;
36
and (6) a Dallas company breach-of-contract action against a Michigan
company for breaching a purchase agreement for assets located in Michi-
gan. 37 No commercial cases in Texas state courts upheld general
jurisdiction.
Texas state courts denied jurisdiction in (1) an ancillary probate action
against nonresident heirs for illegal withdrawal of funds from a Laredo
bank;38 (2) a claim against nonresidents for reimbursement of fees for an
Alaskan hunting trip that plaintiff had to cancel;39 (3) a wrongful-dis-
charge claim by a Texas employee against an Oklahoma boat dealer, in
which the dealer had a loose corporate affiliation with the Texas boat
dealer where plaintiff was employed;40 (4) a Texas investor's claim
against three California defendants-a bank, an investment firm, and the
firm's manager-for breach of contract and fraud in relation to California
investments; 41 and (5) a Texas business's claim against an Illinois-based
company for fraud in the purchase of a San Antonio apartment
complex. 42
31. Id. at 409-10.
32. Ennis v. Loiseau, 164 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.).
33. Tempest Broad. Corp. v. Imlay, 150 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, no pet. h.).
34. Morris v. Zesati, 162 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet. h.). This case
also serves as a good illustration of the jurisdictional allegations necessary to support a
default judgment.
35. IRA Res., Inc. v. Griego, 161 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet.
filed). Interestingly, no jurisdiction was found against two other California defendants in
the same action.
36. I & JC Corp. v. Helen of Troy, L.P., 164 S.W.3d 877, 890 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2005, pet. denied).
37. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Partners for Ins., L.L.C., No. CIVA 3:03-CV-
1665-B, 2005 WL 280323 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2005).
38. Brittingham-Sada de Powers v. The Ancillary Estate of Brittingham-McLean, 158
S.W.3d 518 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
39. Zimmerman v. Glacier Guides, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no
pet. h.).
40. Nichols v. Bridges, 163 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
41. Bryant v. Roblee, 153 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet. h.).
42. Oryx Capital Int'l, Inc. v. Sage Apartments, L.L.C., 167 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2005, no pet. h.).
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Texas federal courts applying the Texas long arm in diversity cases
found specific jurisdiction in (1) a Houston company's claim against an
Ohio bank for alleged misappropriation of trade secrets relating to plain-
tiff's banking overdraft-protection service;4 3 (2) a Texas homeowner's
third-party claim against a nonresident carrier, in which the carrier ar-
ranged a shipment to Texas that led to litigation against the home-
owner;44 (3) investors' claims against a nonresident accounting firm for
negligence and fraud;45 and (4) an employment claim against a German
employer for work done primarily in Germany.46 One Texas court found
general jurisdiction over investors' claims against a nonresident interna-
tional accounting association for negligence and fraud.4 7
Federal courts applying the Texas long arm in diversity cases found
neither general nor specific jurisdiction in actions against (1) a Maryland
boatyard to recover the value of a sunken yacht moored there for re-
pairs;48 or (2) an Ohio company for its continued use of patented technol-
ogy after the license had expired.
49
2. The Texas Long Arm in Non-Commercial Tort Claims and Other
Cases
In Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc.,50 the plaintiff filed a defama-
tion case in Texas court for actions arising entirely in Europe. This fo-
rum-shopping choice was quite puzzling, as it would have afforded
defendants First Amendment protections unavailable in Europe. The
plaintiff, Thomas Borer was the Swiss ambassador to Germany. In 1999
he married Shawne Fielding, a Dallas native, and they lived in Germany
while he completed his diplomatic duties. While there, certain German
newspapers published allegedly defamatory stories about both Borer and
his wife. After moving to Texas, the couple filed defamation actions in a
Texas state court against two German publications.5 1 Defendants re-
moved the case to federal court in Dallas, which dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal on appeal,
finding that the German publications' respective circulations in Texas
were too small to support jurisdiction under the Supreme Court's juris-
43. MJCM, L.L.C., v. Sky Bank, No. Civ.A. H-05-0664, 2005 WL 2121549 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 31, 2005).
44. United Van Lines, L.L.C. v. Marks, 366 F. Supp. 2d 468 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
45. Deloitte & Touche Neth. Antilles & Aruba v. Ulrich, 172 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2005, pet. denied).
46. KMG Kanal-Muller-Gruppe Deutschland GMBH & Co. KG v. Davis, 175 S.W.3d
379 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
47. Deloitte & Touche Neth., 172 S.W.3d at 264-69.
48. Barney F. Kogen & Co. v. Tred Avon Assocs., 393 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D. Tex.
2005).
49. Hanson Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Bridge Techs. L.L.C., 351 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Tex.
2004).
50. 415 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2005).
51. Id. at 422-24.
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dictional tests for defamation. 52 The appellate court also upheld the dis-
trict court's refusal to grant plaintiffs' request for additional discovery
supporting jurisdiction.
53
Dickerson v. Doyle54 offers another interesting fact setting. Frank
Doyle worked for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and lived with his
wife Roelmina in Korea. While there, an American soldier named Bob
Dickerson moved in with them and began a sexual relationship with
Roelmina, allegedly resulting in the birth of Robert Doyle. When Frank
and Roelmina moved to New York, Dickerson moved in with them.
When Dickerson moved to El Paso, Roelmina, Frank, Robert, and the
Doyle's teenage daughter joined him. Frank then returned to Korea to
work with the Corps of Engineers, hoping that Roelmina and the children
would join him. Dickerson, on the other hand, took a job in Hawaii and
wanted Robert to go with him. Thus, Dickerson arranged for paternity
tests for Robert. Fearing verbal and physical abuse and the loss of Rob-
ert to Dickerson, Roelmina fled to Alabama. When Dickerson filed a
paternity action in El Paso, Roelmina was served in Alabama, and Frank
was served in Korea. Both raised personal-jurisdiction objections. 55 The
trial court agreed and dismissed the case. The El Paso Court of Appeals
affirmed, finding that, while the trial court lacked authority under Texas
law to dismiss under forum non conveniens,56 the dismissal was appropri-
ate on personal-jurisdiction grounds.57 This was not a determination of
home-state jurisdiction; rather, it was only a determination of personal
jurisdiction.
Metis International, L.L.C. v. Ace INA Holdings, Inc. 58 arose from a
Texas company's suit against two Mexican companies for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets. In this case, plaintiff Metis and its predecessor com-
pany (Segulinea, Inc.) agreed with Ace INA Holdings to form a
partnership to market pre-paid insurance cards. Segulinea required Ace
to sign a confidentiality agreement, but no further written agreement ever
resulted. Eventually, Ace's subsidiary (Ace Seguros, S.A.) began selling
its own pre-paid insurance cards. Metis sued in a San Antonio federal
court, and defendants challenged jurisdiction. The court held that it
lacked jurisdiction over the subsidiary but had jurisdiction over the par-
ent with whom plaintiffs had entered the agreement. 59
In Exito Electronics Co. v. Trejo,60 a court of appeals reconsidered ju-
risdiction after the Texas Supreme Court reversed its earlier finding that
defendants had waived its jurisdictional objection with defective affida-
52. Id. at 424-28 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
53. Id. at 428-29.
54. 170 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet. h.).
55. Id. at 715-18.
56. Id. at 718-20.
57. Id. at 721.
58. No. Civ.A SA-04CA-XR, 2005 WL 1072587 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2005).
59. Id.
60. 166 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet. h.).
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vits. On remand, the court of appeals maintained its finding of jurisdic-
tion, this time based on general jurisdiction. The court also rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant waived its jurisdictional objection
for failing to object to jurisdiction in another Texas lawsuit.
61
In other cases, Texas state and federal courts found no jurisdiction in
(1) a claim against shareholders of an undercapitalized corporation for
personal injuries in a fire caused by a defective radio;62 (2) a Texas jew-
eler's complaint against a New Mexico company for the development of
scleroderma, which was allegedly caused by toxic cleaning materials sup-
plied by the New Mexico company; 63 (3) an insurance coverage dispute
with a Swedish insurer regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center;64 (4) two multidistrict actions against New
Jersey defendants for allegedly mishandling corpses purchased for medi-
cal uses from the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston.
65
3. Long Arms in Federal-Question Cases
Federal courts ordinarily use the long-arm statute of the state where
they are located, but in a few instances use a federal long-arm statute.
a. Texas contacts-federal-question cases applying the Texas long
arm
Most claims arising under federal law lack an accompanying federal
long-arm statute, and thus are limited to the forum state's jurisdictional
reach. Because Texas extends its long arm to the full reach of due pro-
cess, federal-question defendants are amenable if they satisfy any of the
Texas long arms. Federal courts decided only one case involving the
Texas long arm this past year. Nocando Mem Holdings, Ltd. v. Credit
Commercial de France, S.A. 66 involved a class action for investment fraud
under both state and federal law. Defendants, various foreign entities,
encouraged investments in InverWorld, a company that was fraudulently
made to appear solvent by Texas-based Sharp Capital. The plaintiff class
sued in a San Antonio federal court, and the nonresident defendants
challenged Texas jurisdiction. The court found that they had specific-ju-
risdiction over most of the foreign financial defendants under the Texas
long arm statute because of the Texas contacts through Sharp. 67 The for-
eign defendants not having those contacts are discussed in the section
immediately below.
61. Id. at 849, 860.
62. Ramirez v. Hariri, 165 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
63. Thunderbird Supply Co. v. Williams, 161 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005,
no pet. h.).
64. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., v. IF P&C Ins., Ltd., No. Civ.A
3:04CV2185-G, 2005 WL 1639282, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2005).
65. Perna v. Taylor, 146 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.); Perna v.
Hogan, 162 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
66. No. Civ.A.SA-01-1194-XR, 2004 WL 2603739, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2004).
67. Id. at *1, *12-28.
1048 [Vol. 59
Conflict of Laws
b. Nationwide contacts-federal-question cases applying a federal
long arm
In certain situations, such as when foreign defendants are not otherwise
subject to the jurisdictional reach of any one state, Rule 4(k)(1)-(2) al-
lows for a nationwide-contacts analysis. Under a nationwide-contacts
analysis, sufficient contacts are assessed with the United States as a
whole, rather than any one state.68 In the Nocando case noted immedi-
ately above, two foreign financial institutions-a Bahamian bank and a
Swiss bank-lacked sufficient direct contacts with Texas. They were
nonetheless held amenable to the Texas lawsuit for their nationwide con-
tacts in allegedly furthering a fraudulent investment scheme. 69
4. Internet Jurisdiction
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts. The test breaks down Internet use into a spectrum of
three areas. On one end of the spectrum, personal jurisdiction is found
over a defendant that enters contracts with forum residents that involve
transmission of computer files over the Internet. At the other end of the
spectrum, personal jurisdiction is not found over a defendant that creates
a website that does little more than make information available. In the
middle of the spectrum, jurisdiction depends on the level of interactivity
and the commercial nature of the information exchanged between the
forum resident and the defendant's host computer.70 Four cases during
the Survey period considered arguments for Internet jurisdiction as a ba-
sis for specific personal jurisdiction. Paolino v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C.
questioned Mink's (or Zippo's) application to general jurisdiction be-
cause the action did not arise in Texas.71 As the court explained, under a
general jurisdiction analysis, it is not enough that an interactive website
has the potential to reach a significant percentage of the forum state's
population. Rather, there must be proof that the website is actually
reaching a portion of the state's population. However, the difficult as-
sessment was unnecessary in this case because the defendant's website
was only minimally interactive and did not target Texas residents. Thus,
there was no jurisdiction.72
Global 360, Inc. v. Spittin' Image Software, Inc. 73 was a copyright-in-
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)-(2).
69. Nocando, 2004 WL 2603739, at *37-39.
70. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) and other cases cited therein. The Fifth Circuit adopted the Zippo test in Mink v.
AAAA Dev., L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). Intermediate Texas appellate
courts have used that test as well. See, e.g., Experimental Aircraft Ass'n Inc. v. Doctor, 76
S.W.3d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. filed); Townsend v. Univ. Hosp.,
83 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
71. 401 F. Supp. 2d 712 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
72. Id. at 723-24 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467
(5th Cir. 2002)).
73. No. Civ.A 3:04-CV-1837-L, 2005 WL 625493, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2005).
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fringement action brought by Global against Spittin' Image and
ImageMAKER. ImageMAKER did not dispute that their website, Imag-
ingforWindows.com, was an interactive website on the Mink sliding scale;
rather, they claimed that their activity did not meet the Texas minimum-
contacts requirement. The district court looked at the interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information through the site ac-
cording to Zippo. The court determined that ImageMAKER met the
minimum-contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction because it sold
the allegedly infringing products in Texas via its website, engaged in busi-
ness transactions in Texas, and entered into contracts over the Internet
with Texas residents. As such, ImageMAKER's Internet activities met
the minimum-contracts requirement of purposeful availment of the privi-
lege of conducting business in Texas. 74
In I & JC Corp. v. Helen of Troy, L.P.,75 a Texas state court found
personal jurisdiction over I & JC through its maintenance of an interac-
tive website marketing hair care products to Texas residents. I & JC also
paid search engines to direct users to their site and allowed placement of
orders through it. Therefore, the court held that the website fell into the
interactive category on the Mink (or Zippo) sliding scale, and that this
degree of interactivity was sufficient to support the exercise of
jurisdiction.
76
Khalil v. Chatham College held that a Pennsylvania university's passive
website did not create sufficient contact with Texas for Texas courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the university. 77
5. Status Jurisdiction
Status jurisdiction is a special category of jurisdiction that recognizes a
state's authority to adjudicate issues such as marital status, parental cus-
tody, and mental competence. It is often characterized as subject-matter
jurisdiction but turns on amenability factors such as contacts with the fo-
rum state. Mental-competence and marital-status cases do not often
cause problems, as competence determinations do not often implicate in-
terstate issues and marital-status litigation tends to tolerate parallel suits
in different states and countries. However, conflicting judgments and pa-
rental abductions create problems with child-custody cases. The solution
has been legislation in the form of uniform acts or treaties designed to
choose a single custody forum that other states will respect. Domesti-
cally, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
("UCCJEA") 78 and federally, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
("PKPA") 79 establish unitary child-custody jurisdiction and apply full
faith and credit to those decisions. Internationally, the UCCJEA governs
74. Id. at *4-5.
75. 164 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
76. Id. at 888-89.
77. 391 F. Supp. 2d 588, 594 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
78. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.101-.317 (Vernon 2002).
79. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (West 2005).
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both jurisdictional disputes and decree enforcement,80 and the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act8 l ("ICARA," the United States
version of the Hague Convention on Child Abduction 82) seeks the return
of children taken both within the United States and across international
borders in violation of valid custody orders. These acts often involve
judgment enforcement and preclusion but are discussed here because
they also involve questions of status jurisdiction.
a. Interstate custody disputes
Two Survey-period cases involved interstate custody and related dis-
putes. In re B. T. T. held that Texas had jurisdiction to consider an alleged
father's motion to nullify a prior Hawaii order establishing paternity and
a Texas order to pay child-support arrearages.8 3 In 1996, B.T.T.'s mother,
Emily Braddy, filed a paternity suit against Harold Thomas in Texas
under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.84 At the time, Thomas
was serving on active military duty in Hawaii, resulting in a reciprocal suit
there. In 1997, the Hawaii court entered a default order against Thomas,
establishing paternity and awarding child support. In 1999, the Texas At-
torney General filed a notice of registration of a foreign support order
based on the Hawaii order and reduced it to a Texas arrearage
judgment.
85
After DNA tests excluded Thomas as B.T.T.'s biological father, he
sued in Hawaii to set aside the 1997 paternity and child-support order as
being null and void under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940
("SCRA"). 86 In 2003, the Hawaii family court granted Thomas' motion
and set aside its 1997 order. Thomas's Bexar County motion to set aside
the arrearage judgment was granted in June 2003. The mother appealed,
arguing that Thomas waived his collateral attack by failing to contest the
earlier Hawaii judgment within twenty days of its filing in Texas.87 The
San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld the recognition of the later Hawaii
order, finding no reason why the Texas Family Code would disallow a
later judgment under SCRA or enforcement of full faith and credit. 88
In re G.M.8 9 is an unreported opinion with both interstate and interna-
tional concerns. Paul Marinkovich and Sindi Graber obtained a court-
80. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.105 (Vernon 2005). The PKPA does not apply to
child-custody conflicts with foreign countries.
81. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601-11610 (West 2005).
82. Internal Child Abduction Convention Between the United States of America and
the Governments Done at the Hague October 25, 1980, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980,
1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983).
83. In re B.T.T., 156 S.W.3d 612, 613 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
84. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159.001-.902 (Vernon 2005).
85. In re B.T.T., 156 S.W.3d at 613.
86. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 501 (West 2005).
87. In re B.T.T., 156 S.W.3d at 613-14 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.606(a)
(Vernon 2002)).
88. Id. at 614-15.
89. No. 13-02-00228-CV, 2005 WL 375479, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 17,
2005, no pet. h.).
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approved separation and support agreement from a California court,
which included an award of joint custody of their child G.M. In 1995,
Sindi filed an action in Texas seeking sole custody of G.M. and alleging
that no other court had continuing jurisdiction. The Texas court awarded
sole managing conservatorship to Sindi and possessory conservatorship to
Paul. Paul returned to court in 1996, seeking to modify on the grounds
that Sindi had taken the child to Sweden in violation of the Texas order
and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction. 90
After the Texas court granted Paul's motion and awarded him primary
custody, Sindi filed a pro se appeal. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's decision favoring Paul, but a concurring opinion raised concerns
that the Texas court lacked child-custody jurisdiction from the beginning
because of the prior California custody order.91
b. International custody disputes
Filsinger v. Filsinger92 involved a child from Finland embroiled in par-
allel custody suits in Texas and Florida. Brad and Meeri Filsinger sepa-
rated in June 2000 after six months of marriage. Meeri, who was
pregnant, left their marital home in Florida and returned to her home in
Finland. On January 1, 2001, Meeri gave birth to a son in Finland. One
month later, she and the child traveled to Florida to live with Brad. The
attempted reconciliation failed, though, and on March 13, 2001, Brad
filed for divorce in Florida. Brad also obtained an order prohibiting
Meeri from removing the child from Florida during the divorce action.
Despite the order, Meeri returned to Finland with the child and sued for
custody there. Back in Florida, criminal charges were filed against Meeri
for interference with child custody.93
Though the Florida court granted the divorce on November 21, 2001, it
declined to hear the custody and visitation issues, deferring that jurisdic-
tion to Finland since the child had been born and lived there most of his
life. It did, however, expressly retain jurisdiction over child-support mat-
ters, any modifications, and enforcement powers. Two years later, the
Finnish court awarded custody to Meeri and ordered Meeri not to unilat-
erally remove the child from Finland.94 Both parties appealed the Finn-
ish judgment, however, and before the appellate opinion would be
rendered, Meeri and the child moved to El Paso, Texas, to live with
Meeri's fianc6. Meeri did not inform Brad or the Finnish court that she
had moved. Meeri was arrested in Texas in September 2003 on the out-
standing Florida warrants. Texas child-protective-services authorities
took her son into custody; he was then given to Brad for return to
90. Id. at *1-4.
91. Id. at *2-7.







After successive actions in Florida and Finland, parallel actions arose.
In September 2003, Brad filed for custody in the Florida court that had
granted the divorce and expressly retained jurisdiction over child-support
issues. In October 2003, Meeri sued for custody in El Paso, alleging that
no other court had continuing exclusive jurisdiction. Although she did
not mention the Finnish custody determination, Meeri did file a habeas
corpus application based on the Finnish judgment. The El Paso trial
court granted the habeas writ and ordered Brad to return the child. Brad
did not comply with the order, objecting to the exercise of jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA and requesting the Texas court to confer with the
Florida court.
96
On October 4, 2003, the Florida court concluded that it had jurisdiction
and awarded temporary custody to Brad. Two months later, the Florida
court denied Meeri's motions to dismiss the Florida custody proceedings
and to enforce the Texas writ of attachment. That same month, the Texas
trial court conferred with the Florida court and decided to exercise juris-
diction. On January 14, 2004, the Texas trial court awarded custody to
Meeri and ordered Brad to pay child support. Meeri subsequently filed a
motion in Florida to enforce the Texas writ. The Florida court denied it,
concluding that Texas did not have home-state jurisdiction, the Texas or-
ders were not entitled to full faith and credit because they were not in
substantial conformity with the UCCJEA, the Finnish court no longer
had jurisdiction because both parties had permanently left Finland, and
Florida was the most appropriate state to exercise jurisdiction in con-
formity with UCCJEA. On appeal in Texas, the El Paso Court of Ap-
peals agreed and dismissed the Texas case. 97
D. REASONS FOR DECLINING OTHERWISE-VALID JURISDICTION
Even if all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from litigat-
ing cases involving a sovereign foreign government, cases contractually
directed at other forums, cases in which convenience dictates another fo-
rum, and cases parallel to other litigation. There were no sovereign-im-
munity cases, but examples did occur in the other three categories.
1. Derogating Forum-Selection Clauses
Section B above discusses forum-selection clauses that establish local
jurisdiction.98 Somewhat different considerations arise when the plaintiff
sues in a forum contrary to the forum agreed upon in the forum-selection
clause. These are known as derogation clauses (in regard to that forum),
95. Id.
96. Id. at *1-2.
97. Id. at *24.
98. See SCOLES & MAY, supra note 13 (citing sources discussing this distinction), and
Ensco Offshore Co. v. Titan Marine L.L.C., 370 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (discuss-
ing prorogating forum clauses consenting to the forum's jurisdiction).
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and instead of requiring justifications for the court to retain the case, they
require justifications for the court to decline its otherwise-valid jurisdic-
tion over the parties. The Survey period produced twelve such cases, in-
cluding Drug Test USA v. Buyers Shopping Network, Inc., an important
decision from the Waco Court of Appeals that struggles with the cloudy
relationship between two Texas statutes governing the parties' power to
choose their forum and governing law.99 In this case, Drug Test USA, a
Texas company, sued Buyers Shopping Network, a Florida company, for
breach of contract. Buyers objected to personal jurisdiction in the Texas
court based on the contract's designation of a Florida forum. Drug Test
argued that the forum clause was unenforceable because it violated sec-
tion 35.53 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, which requires
"contracts to which this section applies" to be "set out conspicuously in
print, type, or other form of writing that is bold-faced, capitalized, under-
lined, or otherwise set out in such a manner that a reasonable person
against whom the provision may operate would notice."''° The preced-
ing subsection of the statute defines its scope as applying to (1) contracts
for the sale, rental, or disposition of goods for $50,000 or less; (2) in which
any element occurred in Texas and a contracting party is a Texas resident,
a Texas-created entity, or an entity with its principal place of business in
Texas; and (3) to which section 1.105 of the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code does not apply.
101
Section 1.105(a) is part of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
and gives parties to UCC transactions the power to choose the governing
law if it has a reasonable relation to their transaction. 10 2 Section 1.105(a)
only governs the parties' choice of law and not their choice of forum.
Nonetheless, according the plain language of section 35.53, contracts
under section 1.105 are exempt from section 35.53. Drug Test argued that
this led to an absurd result-that because of the UCC's broad scope, sec-
tion 35.53 "would never apply to any contract anywhere at any time in
Texas." 10
3
The court of appeals agreed and reversed the trial court's dismissal.
The court reasoned that, if all contracts under section 1.105(a) (contracts
in which one Texas party designated a reasonably related law) are ex-
cluded from the conspicuous-print requirement of section 35.53, then the
latter will not apply to any contracts except those in which a Texas party
chooses a law unrelated to the transaction. 10 4 A dissenting justice ar-
gued that this meaning is not absurd and in fact, makes perfect sense-
that contracts choosing an unrelated law must do so in conspicuous
99. 154 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet. h.).
100. Id. at 192 (quoting TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 35.53(b) (Vernon 2005)).
101. Id. at 192-93 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.53(a) (Vernon 2005)).
102. This law is now codified without substantive change as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 1.301 (Vernon 2005).
103. Drug Test USA, 154 S.W.3d at 193.
104. Id. at 193-96.
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print.'0 5 The majority, however, adopted an interpretation more absurd
than the one it rejected. That is, the court held that section 35.53 only
excluded the few contracts specifically mentioned under section 1.105(b).
Section 1.105(b) is an exception to section 1.105(a) and provides that if
the UCC has a more specific choice-of-law provision, section 1.105(a) and
the parties' power to choose their law does not apply. The court thus
held that section 35.53's exclusionary reference to section 1.105 was not
to its primary provision but to an exception to that provision. 10 6 As the
majority opinion points out, these statutes need clarifying.
Boutte v. Cenac Towing, Inc.10 7 is a case of first impression in the Fifth
Circuit, involving a forum clause in a Jones Act claim. Cenac Towing,
incorporated and based in Louisiana, hired Louisiana resident Eric
Boutte for maritime duties. Boutte injured his elbow while working on
the Ohio River in Kentucky and reinjured it while working in Freeport,
Texas. Boutte sued in federal court in Galveston. The defendant at-
tempted to invoke the employment agreement's clause, which negated all
courts outside of Louisiana, specifically Texas courts' 08 The defendant
reserved his right to seek a venue transfer based on the forum clause and
filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion to disregard the forum clause.
On reconsideration of the dismissal motion, the plaintiff argued that the
Jones Act incorporates the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA"),
and FELA does not permit forum clauses. 10 9 Although the issue of
whether FELA's forum clause prohibition should be imputed to Jones
Act claims was one of first impression for the Fifth Circuit, the court
traced the case law from other circuits and found in the plaintiff's
favor.110
Aerus L.L.C. v. Pro Team, Inc."' provides a good interpretive analysis
for forum-selection clauses, as it involves three forum clauses in two
agreements for the same venture. In particular, the court had to address
which law governed the interpretation of the forum clauses, the priority
of contrary forum clauses in multiple contracts between the parties, and
the distinction between exclusive and permissive forum clauses in the
same contract. Aerus L.L.C. (formerly Electrolux) is a Texas-based man-
ufacturer of cleaning equipment such as vacuum cleaners. In 2001, Aerus
105. Id. at 196 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 193-96.
107. 346 F. Supp. 2d 922 (S.D. Tex. 2004). The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. app. 688 (West
2005), governs employment-related injuries under traditional admiralty jurisdiction.
108. Boutte, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 923-25. A single sheet of paper-apparently the only
written part of the employment agreement-titled "Choice of Forum Agreement" stated in
bold type: "I SPECIFICALLY AGREE THAT I WILL NEVER FILE A SUIT FOR
PERSONAL INJURY AGAINST CENAC TOWING, INC. IN A STATE OR FED-
ERAL COURT LOACTED OUTSIDE THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, INCLUDING
THE STATE OF TEXAS." Id. at 925.
109. See id. at 927-28 (discussing Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 55-56
(West 2005)).
110. Id. at 925-34.
111. No. Civ.A. 304CV1985M, 2005 WL 1131093, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2005).
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entered a joint marketing agreement with Pro Team, an Idaho company
that markets floor-care products for janitorial services. According to the
agreement, Pro Team would purchase, sell, market, and distribute
Aerus's products. The agreement also dealt with Pro Team's use of
Aerus's trademarks and other intellectual property. Specifically, it pro-
vided that "[i]n the event [Aerus, LLC] asserts a breach or default by
ProTeam under the terms of this Agreement, the jurisdiction, venue, and
applicable law shall be the State of Texas, United States." 1 2 The parties
ended this relationship with a 2003 Termination, Transition and Release
Agreement. The 2003 Termination Agreement had two conflicting
clauses. The first clause provided that, for claims by either party for
breach of the 2003 Agreement, "the jurisdiction, venue, and applicable
law shall be [the] City of San Diego, California. '' 113 The second clause
provided that any disputes regarding trademarks, branding, or confidenti-
ality may be brought in any court having jurisdiction.11 4 Wading through
these ambiguous and contrary clauses, the court found that (1) Texas law
controlled the interpretation of the conflicting forum clauses, not because
Texas law was designated in the contract, but because Texas was the fo-
rum state;1 15 (2) the 2003 agreement superseded the 2001 agreement be-
cause of the former's integration clause, in spite of language in the 2001
Agreement that it would survive any termination of the agreement; (3)
the exclusive forum clause controlled over the permissive clause in the
2003 agreement. The plaintiff argued that the ambiguous forum clauses
in the 2003 agreement made both clauses permissive; the court found in-
stead that the more specific choice of the California forum applied specif-
ically to the claims raised in this action. Therefore, the court ordered a
transfer to California and was thus spared the task of applying the laws of
San Diego the 2003 agreement designated.
116
In Abramson v. America Online, Inc.,117 the court enforced AOL's fo-
rum clause even though the transaction originated in Texas. Plaintiff
Elaine Abramson sued America Online in a Dallas federal court for al-
lowing her email address to be used as an originator of thousands of
messages with pornographic or lascivious content. Defendant moved to
dismiss, invoking the forum-selection clause, which required litigation in
"the courts of Virginia."'1 8 The district court found the clause enforcea-
ble as a valid contract. Plaintiff objected, arguing that she had not con-
sented to the contract and had not received notice of the contract because
her son set up the account with defendant. The court found an agency
relationship between the son and mother, emphasizing that, even if the
son was not fully authorized to act on plaintiff's behalf, she had ratified
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id. at *1
116. Id. at *2-3.
117. 393 F. Supp. 2d 438 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
118. Id. at 440.
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his actions. Therefore, the court declined defendant's motion to dismiss
and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Virginia. t1 9
In Michiana Easy Livin', the Texas Supreme Court denied Texas juris-
diction and gave effect to an Indiana choice-of-law clause. It rejected the
plaintiff's arguments that the defendant had waived the clause by not
raising it at the special appearance and that the clause should be limited
to its express language.
1 20
In other cases, courts upheld forum clauses (1) designating Norway as
the forum for litigation of unseaworthiness on a boat purchased in Hous-
ton;12 1 (2) designating Mississippi as the appropriate forum for the en-
forcement of gambling debts incurred there, which caused the dismissal
of a Texas resident's action seeking a declaration that the debt violated
Texas public policy;122 (3) designating arbitration in Dayton, Ohio for any
technology-licensing disputes.
123
Courts denied forum clauses (1) designating California as the forum for
breach of a recording contract because the clause was permissive rather
than exclusive; 2 4 (2) designating New York as the situs for a manager's
claim against a boxer because the defendant failed to prove that the
clause was legal under New York law;125 and (3) designating New York as
the situs for arbitration in an insurance-coverage dispute related to the
Enron litigation.12 6 In addition, a federal court in Texas denied a Texas
forum clause and upheld a Hong Kong judgment because, in spite of the
parties' agreement to litigate in Texas, the Texas forum clause was
permissive. 1
27
2. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common-law
objection to jurisdiction that is now available by statutes; for instance, 28
U.S.C. § 1404 allows intra-jurisdictional transfers based on conve-
nience.' 28 However, because intra-federal transfers under § 1404 do not
119. Id. at 440-43.
120. Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 792-94 (Tex. 2005).
121. Hellenic Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas, No. Civ.A. H-04-3010, 2005 WL
1693150, at *12 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2005).
122. Phillips v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., No. Civ.A 3:04-CV-02023, 2004 WL
2533589, at *1-3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2004).
123. Hanson Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Bridge Techs. L.L.C., 351 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Tex.
2004).
124. Williams v. RIP Records, No. Civ.A H-05-183, 2005 WL 1924181, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 9, 2005).
125. Lowing v. Williams, No. 07-03-0393-CV, 2005 WL 20531 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
Jan. 4, 2005, no pet. h.).
126. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation, 391 F. Supp. 2d 541
(S.D. Tex. 2005). See infra notes 170-75 for a more complete discussion.
127. Siko Ventures, Ltd. v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C., No. SA-05-CA-100-OG, 2005 WL
2233205, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005).
128. Federal law provides for a transfer to another federal court in the case of an incon-
venient forum under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (West 2005). Texas law provides for in-state
venue transfers based on convenience under TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.002(b) (Vernon 2005).
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implicate conflicts between states or nations, they are not considered
here. This Article is limited to inter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens
under the common law, which is available in state and federal courts in
Texas if the movant shows that an adequate alternative forum is available
and that a balancing of private and public interests favors transfer.
129
In a case by a Thai parent against a Texas resident for the alleged sex-
ual molestation of her children in Thailand, a federal court in Dallas
granted a forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of litigation in Thai-
land.1 30 In two other cases, Texas federal courts granted forum non con-
veniens dismissals against Ford Motor Company for accidents in
Venezuela and Mexico. In one, the court held that the plaintiffs' unwill-
ingness to litigate in a parallel action in Venezuela was irrelevant to the
issue of an available alternative forum. 3 1 In the other, the court denied
forum non conveniens dismissal in the largest bankruptcy ever filed in the
United States.
132
When considering the private interests in favor of transfer, courts gen-
erally look to the parties' convenience. They consider the relative ease of
access to sources of proof, the availability and cost of compulsory process
for obtaining the attendance of unwilling witnesses, the possibility of
viewing the premises if appropriate, and all other practical problems that
make the trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. When considering the
public interests in favor of transfer, courts generally look to the court's
concerns and the forum state's interests. They consider the administra-
tive difficulties flowing from court congestion, the local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home, the interest in having a diversity
case tried in a forum familiar with the law that must govern the action,
the avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws problems, and the unfair-
ness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. 133
129. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251-55 (1981).
130. Boonma v. Bredimus, No. Civ.A.3:05-CV-0684-0, 2005 WL 1831967, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. July 29, 2005). See also Punyee v. Bredimus, No. Civ.A.3:05-CV-0893-G, 2004 WL
2511144, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2004) and James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of
Laws, 58 SMU L. REV. 679, 698 (2005) (discussing Punyee v. Bredimus).
131. Lizardo v. Ford Motor Co., No. CIV.A.13-04-187, 2005 WL 1164200, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. May 10, 2005) (noting this case's relationship to Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F.
Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004)); Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., No. Civ. 13-04-036, 2004 WL
2952612 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
132. See In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 399 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
133. McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 423-24 (5th Cir. 2001). Texas
forum non conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051
(Vernon Supp. 2003) applies to personal injury and wrongful death claims. Acts of 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 424, § 2, repealed by Acts of 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204, § 3.09 (effective Sept. 1,
2003) apply to asbestosis claims filed by persons not residing in Texas when their claims
arose. Common law forum non conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, governs all
other interstate and international forum-convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re




Parallel litigation is difficult to define. Sometimes it means identical
lawsuits with exactly the same parties bringing the same claims; some-
times it means two or more lawsuits that may result in claim preclusion
for some or all parties. It occurs both intra- and inter-jurisdictionally.
Remedies include transfer and consolidation (intra-jurisdictional only),
stay, dismissal, and anti-suit injunction. In many cases, courts allow both
cases to proceed and the first to judgment precludes the other.134 This
Article discusses only parallel litigation involving at least one case outside
of Texas; in other words, it will not consider multiple related actions in-
volving courts only located in Texas.
One of the Survey period's most interesting cases fits under several
categories-choice of law, forum non conveniens, and personal jurisdic-
tion-but is placed here because of its size and significance. In re Yukos
Oil Co. concerns the largest bankruptcy ever filed in the United States.135
Yukos is a holding company for approximately 200 entities organized, in-
ter alia, under the laws of the Russian Federation, Cyprus, and the United
Kingdom. It became Russia's first privatized oil company in 1995 and has
100,000 employees, nearly all in Russia. In December 2003, the Russian
government began pursuing retroactive taxes of $27.5 billion for periods
beginning in 2000. Yukos filed lawsuits in Russia and several other coun-
tries, seeking either to protest the tax or to seek other shelter. For in-
stance, on December 14, 2004, Yukos incorporated a subsidiary in Texas,
Yukos USA, and deposited $480,000 in the Southwest Bank of Texas.
Less than two hours later, Yukos filed its petition in bankruptcy in Hous-
ton.136 Deutsche Bank AG, a German bank and creditor of Yukos,
moved to dismiss Yukos's bankruptcy petition on several grounds, includ-
ing eligible debtor status, forum non conveniens, comity, and the act-of-
state doctrine. The bankruptcy court found each one of these grounds
inadequate standing alone. The Texas bank deposit made Yukos an eligi-
ble debtor even though it was a foreign corporation. 137 The application
of forum non conveniens was unclear under legal precedent, and the
court declined to extend it.138 A comity dismissal was vague at best,' 39
and the act-of-state doctrine did not apply because the court did not need
to evaluate the legality of a final, nonappealable act by the Russian gov-
ernment. 140 The bankruptcy court nonetheless dismissed the case under
a totality-of-the-circumstances argument. Specifically, the court cited:
134. See generally GEORGE, supra note 13 and James P. George, International Parallel
Litigation-A Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 499
(2001).
135. In re Yukos Oil, 321 B.R. at 399.
136. Id. at 400-02.
137. Id. at 399-407.
138. Id. at 407-08.
139. Id. at 408-09.
140. Id. at 409-10. Moreover, the Russian government had not entered an appearance
and had, to the contrary, refused service of process. Id. at 410.
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Yukos's inability to use a bankruptcy reorganization plan without the
Russian government's cooperation because most of its assets are oil and
gas within Russia; the timing of the Texas bank deposit and the bank-
ruptcy filing; the inappropriateness of applying United States law to alter
creditor priorities for a company whose operations should be governed
by Russian and other European laws; the existence of parallel actions in
several other forums including the European Court of Human Rights
(where Yukos protested the excessive tax); and the need for the Russian
government's participation in a dispute that would so heavily impact the
Russian economy.
141
In another bankruptcy case, a Dallas bankruptcy court refused to defer
to Canadian litigation. In that case, a bankruptcy trustee filed a turnover
motion in Dallas seeking the debtor's interest in a 1996 Mexican judg-
ment. The debtor objected, arguing that the money was subject to a re-
ceiver-type action in Canada. Nonetheless, the Dallas bankruptcy court
held that it would consider the turnover order because there was no evi-




The Survey period had two sovereign-immunity opinions, both arising
out of a contractor's claim against the Republic of Congo. One opinion
reaffirmed the sovereign's immunity from garnishment, and the other
awarded attorney's fees to the garnishee. Both cases are fully discussed
below in the Foreign Judgments section.
143
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a review of basic
principles. First, choice-of-law is a question of state law, both in state and
federal courts. 44 Second, it is a question of forum state law. Renvoi-the
practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is almost never em-
ployed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the forum state
remains in control. 145 Third, the forum state has broad power to make
choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject only to
141. Id. at 410-11.
142. In re Offshore Fin. Corp., 319 B.R. 845 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
143. See infra notes 245-48 (discussing Walker Int'l Holdings, Ltd. v. Republic of
Congo, 395 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2004); Walker Int'l Holdings, Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 415
F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2005)).
144. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
145. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. Although commentators promote renvoi's use, they acknowledge its gen-
eral lack of acceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, such as when
statutes direct the use of renvoi. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 13, at 142 (especially n.4);
WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in TEX. Bus. & COM.
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limited constitutional requirements. 146
Within each forum state, a hierarchy of choice-of-law rules govern. At
the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, that is, statutes directing the
application of a state's law when certain events or people are impli-
cated. 147 Second in the hierarchy is party-controlled choice-of-law, that is,
choice of law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dictates
otherwise. 148 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled
in Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws. 149 This Survey Article is organized according to
this hierarchy, that is, beginning with statutory choice-of-law, continuing
with choice-of-law clauses, and concluding with choice-of-law under the
most-significant-relationship test. Special issues such as constitutional
limitations are discussed in the following section. This grouping results in
a discussion that mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of
Texas intermediate appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth
Circuit. In spite of this mix, readers should note that, because choice of
law is a state law issue, the only binding opinions are those of the Texas
Supreme Court.150
A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
The Survey period offered four cases involving choice-of-law statutes-
two involving Texas statutes, two applying Oklahoma statutes, and one of
the latter illustrating the choice-of-law rule for inconvenient forum trans-
fers. Choice-of-law statutes most often involve the forum state applying
its own statute. An exception this year is Precis, Inc. v. Federal Insurance
Co.,151 an insurance-coverage action in which the application of another
state's choice-of-law statute nonetheless resulted in a choice of Texas law
for the merits. Facing claims by customers in a separate Texas state-court
action, Precis filed suit in an Oklahoma state court against two insurers
CODE ANN. §§ 1.105(b), 2.402(b), 4.102(b), 8.106, 9.103 (Vernon 2005). For federal courts,
Klaxon reiterates the forum state's control of choice of law. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 497.
146. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text for a brief description of these con-
stitutional requirements.
147. RESTATEMENT § 6(1) cmt. a (1971). See, e.g., Owens Corning v. Carter, 997
S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas wrongful-death statute
and requiring the court to "apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate to the
case."); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(c) (Vernon 2005) (as amended in
1997, with the same wording as this provision).
148. RESTATEMENT § 187 ("Law of the State Chosen by the Parties") allows con-
tracting parties to choose a governing law within defined limits, as explained infra note 167.
Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex.
1990).
149. See infra note 185 for the factors in RESTATEMENT § 6 (1971).
150. The exceptions are when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue such as
legislative jurisdiction, full faith and credit, or federal questions such as foreign sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 662-63 (Tex.
2004) (legislative jurisdiction); Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132
S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (full faith and credit);
Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361, 373 (5th Cir. 2004) (foreign sovereign
immunity).
151. No. 4:05-CV-411-A, 2005 WL 1639319 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2005).
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that had issued policies for periods in 2003 and 2004. The first policy was
issued in Oklahoma, where Precis was originally headquartered; the com-
pany had since moved to Texas. Based on the policies' language, it was
unclear when the underlying claims by customers had been made, and
thus, Precis sought a declaration of coverage to determine which insurer
should defend and indemnify which customers' claims. The defendant
insurers removed Precis's action to federal court in Oklahoma City, from
which it was transferred to federal court in Dallas and assigned to federal
court in Fort Worth. 152 To determine which law controlled the coverage
issue, the court first noted that for inconvenient forum transfers, the law
of the transferor court controlled. 153 And since federal courts apply the
choice-of-law rules of the local state, Oklahoma law controlled. The court
thus invoked an Oklahoma statute for contract disputes, which states that
the law of the place of performance controls, or, if none is indicated, the
place of making. 154 Applying this, the court held that (1) Texas law gov-
erned the second policy because it was clearly to be performed in Texas
after Precis moved here; and (2) Texas law controlled the original policy
because it had been renewed, and the renewal would also have to be per-
formed in Texas.1
55
Cabelka v. Herring National Bank156 is the second application of an
Oklahoma choice-of-law statute. Oklahoma resident Cabelka sued his
bank, located in Texas, for its alleged negligence in dishonoring his check
of $37,500 for the purchase of two tractors. In granting the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court applied a statute in Oklahoma's
version of the Uniform Commercial Code. According to the statute, the
law of the state where the bank is located applies. Thus, the court held
that Texas law applied. The court also ruled that, to the extent that plain-
tiff's numerous negligence claims (all alleged under Oklahoma law) fell
outside the Code and raised tort issues, the most-significant-relationship
test also pointed to Texas law. 157
A "borrowing statute" is one designating the application of another
state's statute of limitation. Texas has one, and the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals considered it in Malone v. Sewell.158 Sewell was Malone's psy-
chotherapist in Fort Worth during 1995 and 1996. When the treatment
ended, the two began a sexual relationship and moved to Seattle together
later that year. The relationship ended when Malone moved back to Fort
Worth. She then sued Sewell for sexual exploitation, breach of fiduciary
duty, and fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sewell,
applying Washington's three-year limitation period by way of the Texas
152. Id. at *1.
153. Id. at *5 (citing Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990)).
154. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 162 (West 2004)).
155. Id.
156. No. 7:04CV43R, 2005 WL 735035 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2005).
157. Id. at *1-2.
158. 168 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied).
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borrowing statute. 59 The court of appeals reversed, finding that Sewell's
summary-judgment motion failed to establish necessary facts to trigger
the borrowing statute-that the relevant conduct, if it occurred at all, oc-
curred in Washington.
60
A Texas insurance statute provides that Texas law will govern an insur-
ance claim, regardless of the parties' agreement, if (1) the insurance pro-
ceeds are payable to a Texas citizen or inhabitant; (2) the policy is issued
by an insurer doing business in Texas; and (3) the policy is issued in the
course of the insurer's business in Texas. 161 During the Survey period,
this statute applied to an insurer's action seeking a declaration of noncov-
erage for a mortgage lender subject to a deceptive trade practices
claim.1
62
B. CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws permit
contracting parties to choose a governing law,t 63 as reflected in ten Sur-
vey-period cases. In Panatrol Corp. v. Emerson Electric Co.,1 64 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals provided this year's most instructive analysis
for choice-of-law clauses overcome by another state's interests. In 1999, a
frier at a turkey-processing plant in Fredericksburg, Texas, caused a fire
that destroyed a building and its contents. Panatrol manufactured the
allegedly faulty panel, which included a temperature controller made by
Emerson. The plant's owners sued the frier's manufacturer and several
component makers, including Emerson Electric but excluding Panatrol.
Emerson thus brought a third-party claim against Panatrol, and Panatrol
counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment to Panatrol
and Emerson on the plaintiffs' claims; it also granted summary judgment
to Panatrol and Emerson on each other's indemnity claims. The San
Antonio Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the plain-
tiffs' claims. However, the importance of this appeal lies in the choice-of-
law issues in the indemnity claims.
165
As to these claims, the court found Texas law controlling. Although
the contract between Panatrol and Emerson had a Missouri choice-of-law
clause, Panatrol alleged a claim under the Texas Product Liability Act,
which established the component manufacturer's duty.1 66 The court
noted that, under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and
Texas precedent, it was obligated to honor the parties' contractual choice
159. Id. at 253 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a) (Vernon 2005)).
160. Id.
161. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
162. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Amwest Fin., Inc., No. Civ. H-04-4024,
2005 WL 1994290, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2005).
163. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). See also RE-
STATEMENT § 187 (1971).
164. 163 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet. h.).
165. Id. at 184-85, 191.
166. Id. at 186 (referring to the Texas Product Liability Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 82.002(a) (Vernon 2005)).
2006] 1063
SMU LAW REVIEW
of law unless that choice was overcome by a DeSantis analysis, that is,
unless another state's interests outweigh those of the parties' chosen
state. Specifically, the parties' chosen law should govern "unless (1) there
is a state with a more significant relationship to the transaction, and (2)
applying the chosen law would contravene a fundamental policy of that
state, and (3) that state has a materially greater interest in the determina-
tion of the particular issue."'167 Applying that analysis, the court found
the contract's choice of law could be overcome. Missouri's only contact
was as Emerson's state of incorporation. Panatrol, an Illinois corpora-
tion, had ordered the temperature control from an Emerson division in
Illinois, not in Missouri. Further, the claims arose from a Texas fire.
Thus, the more significant contacts were with Texas. 168 The court then
noted that, except for a statutory indemnity rule in Texas, all three states'
laws appeared to be the same. Therefore, the court ignored the false con-
flict and designated Texas law as controlling on the indemnity claims. 169
In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation170 may
be this Survey period's most complex choice-of-law analysis, necessarily
resulting in brief reporting here. In this case, movants sought enforce-
ment of the arbitration provisions of various insurance-coverage policies,
arguing that New York law governed the enforceability of those provi-
sions. The Houston federal court found that New York law did not likely
conflict with Texas law.171 However, to be cautious, the court analyzed
the arbitration agreements under Texas and New York substantive law172
as well as Texas and New York choice-of-law rules. 173 The court also
found that, to the extent that movants' construction of New York law was
accurate (that is, that it compelled enforcement of the arbitration provi-
sions), New York law was inapplicable on two distinct grounds: 1) it bore
no relation to the parties or the contracts; and 2) it contravened impor-
tant Texas public policies. 174 Thus, Texas had a more significant relation-
ship to the dispute.175
In other cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals honored a choice of
Massachusetts law in a suit for unpaid salary and commissions, even
though the defendant employer failed to invoke the clause until its mo-
tion in limine, filed just before the trial.176 An El Paso federal court up-
held the parties' choice of California law in an employment-
discrimination case.177 A San Antonio federal court found the parties'
167. Id. at 187 (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 678 and RESTATEMENT § 187(2)(b)
(1971)).
168. Id. at 186-88.
169. Id. at 188-89.
170. 391 F. Supp. 2d 541 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
171. Id. at 584 n.51.
172. Id. at 580-86.
173. Id. at 582 n.46.
174. Id. at 585.
175. Id. at 595.
176. Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 2004).
177. Lora v. Providian Bancorp Servs., No. EP-05-LA-045-DB, 2005 WL 1743878, at *3
(W.D. Tex. July 22, 2005).
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choice of New Jersey law sufficiently broad to cover tortious interference
with contract claims for the procurement and sale of human bone and
soft tissue. 178 A Houston court of appeals affirmed that the parties'
choice of Pennsylvania law was sufficiently broad to govern an attorney-
fee claim.179 Finally, a Laredo federal court found the parties' choice of
Mexico law applicable to contract and tort claims in an intellectual-prop-
erty dispute, although Mexico law also governed the tort claims under a
most-significant-relationship analysis.1 80
Four Survey-period opinions rejected choice-of-law clauses on the most
basic premises. A federal court in Houston rejected a choice-of-law
clause appearing in an invoice because it was not part of any agreement
between the litigating parties.1 81 An El Paso federal court applied the
same reasoning to reject an unsigned purchase order's choice-of-law
clause, even though that order reflected the parties' dealings. 182 A Dallas
federal court rejected a New York choice-of-law provision and applied
Texas law because both plaintiff and defendant had pleaded their claims
and defenses only under Texas law.183 A Houston federal court rejected
an England choice-of-law clause because it lacked a reasonable relation
with the parties and the dispute, which violated a Texas statute governing
choice-of-law clauses in contracts exceeding a million dollars.
184
C. THE MOST-SIGNIFICANT-RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice-
of-law clause, Texas courts apply the most-significant-relationship test
from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.185 The Survey pe-
riod produced thirteen cases applying the test.
178. Tissue Transplant Tech., Ltd. v. Osteotech, Inc., No. Civ.A.5A-04-CA-0819, 2005
WL 958407, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2005).
179. Fairmont Supply Co. v. Hooks Indus., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 529, 534-37 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). The court observed that it was possible that one
state's law could govern a contract claim while another state's law governed attorney fees;
this practice is called "depecage." However, the court found that it was unnecessary here
because of the wording of the choice-of-law clause. Id. at 534.
180. El Polio Loco, S.A. de C.V. v. El Polio Loco, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 986, 988-90
(S.D. Tex. 2004).
181. Enpro Sys., Ltd. v. Namasco Corp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 874, 893-94 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
182. Sunshine Traders of El Paso, Inc. v. Dolgencorp. Inc., No. EP-02-CA-439-DB,
2005 WL 1009590, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2005).
183. AT&T Corp. v. The Vialink Co., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-1954D, 2005 WL 2007102, at
*4 n.7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2005).
184. Ensco Offshore Co. v. Titan Marine L.L.C., 370 F. Supp. 2d 594, 596-97 (S.D. Tex.
2005) (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (Vernon 2002)).
185. The most-significant-relationship test balances seven factors according to the
needs of the particular case. They are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states, and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies under-
lying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of





National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Rowe 8 6 involved a nationwide
class action seeking reimbursement of child-rider premiums on life insur-
ance policies that were inappropriately collected after the children
reached majority age. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts' certification and remanded for a more rigorous choice-of-law
analysis, as discussed in the Class Certification section. 187 Without ruling
on which law or laws governed, the supreme court noted the pertinence
of section 192 of the Restatement, which governs life insurance contracts.
In particular, the supreme court highlighted the strong interest each state
has in the regulation of local resident's insurance contracts and accord-
ingly, the inappropriateness of one state's law governing a nationwide
class action.188
A federal court in Houston made short work of the need for choice-of-
law analysis in Williams v. Amerus Life Insurance Co.,189 holding in a
footnote that "[t]he most significant relationship test clearly supports ap-
plication of California law to all claims."1 90 Most of the parties had con-
ceded this, but two plaintiffs urged that their claims for certain retained
asset accounts were separate. The court rejected Texas law for those
claims as well, finding that the asset accounts were completely dependent
on the policies concededly governed by California law.191
Fleming & Associates v. Miller & Associates'92 involved a dispute be-
tween attorneys for recovery of litigation expenses. Fleming, a Houston
firm, agreed to work with Miller, a Mississippi firm, in a fen/phen case
that settled before trial. Fleming billed Miller $150,000 for its expenses.
Miller sent Fleming a check for $23,000, but Fleming returned it. Fleming
sued Miller in federal court in Houston, and Miller promptly moved for
summary judgment. In granting a partial summary judgment, the court
rejected Fleming's argument that Texas law should control. Rather,
under section 196 of the Restatement (governing contracts for services),
the case's heavy Mississippi flavor dictated the application of that state's
law.1
93
Lennar Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co. 194 is an unreported but
nonetheless complex opinion concerning insurance coverage for plaintiff
homebuilder's application of defective stucco to numerous homes in
RESTATEMENT § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority, as priority will vary from case
to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most-significant-relationship test includes the
other choice-of-law sections in the Restatement (Second).
186. 164 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2005).
187. See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
188. Nat'l W. Life Ins., 164 S.W.3d at 391-92.
189. No. Civ.A. H-03-4672, 2005 WL 1847111 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
190. Id. at *4 n.3.
191. Id. at *4.
192. No. Civ.A. H-03-4672, 2005 WL 1155118, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 11, 2005).
193. Id. at *2-3.
194. No. 14-02-00860-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4214 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] June 2, 2005, pet. filed).
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Texas. Addressing a number of summary-judgment motions from both
sides, the Houston Court of Appeals found that Texas's choice-of-law
statute for insurance disputes did not apply because the policy was issued
out of Florida. Instead, the court applied a most-significant-relationship
analysis, finding that Texas law governed the coverage claims.
195
2. Tort Cases
A late-released case from the prior Survey period applied the most-
significant-relationship test to a complex securities-fraud claim governed
by state law. Greenberg Traurig v. Moody' 96 was a claim by four Texas
investors against a New York law firm for allegedly committing securities
fraud in the initial public offering for a food-technology venture. The
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's verdict for
over $20 million and ordered a new trial under New York state securities
law rather than Texas law.'
97
In Cates v. Creamer,1 98 the plaintiff sued Hertz and its rental driver in a
Dallas federal court for injuries from a Texas car collision. The trial court
granted summary judgment to Hertz under Texas law. The Fifth Circuit
reversed, finding that the choice-of-law analysis was inadequate. Under
its own analysis, the court found that Florida law should govern because
the bailment relationship was centered there. 199
Stelax Industries, Ltd. v. Donahue2°° involved an employer's claim
against a dishonest employee who, in a conspiracy with outside defend-
ants, apparently bled the company. The facts involved claims potentially
arising in a number of places including Alabama, Texas, New York, and
England. Stelax moved for summary judgment based on Texas law.
When Donahue did not respond, the court noted that his acquiescence
waived any objection to Texas law. After a sua sponte choice-of-law anal-
ysis demonstrating Texas law's applicability, the court granted the plain-
tiff's summary judgment. 20'
In other cases, a Dallas federal court applied Texas law to an
Oklahoma resident's claim that a Texas bank negligently handled his
draft.202 Finally, the First District Court of Appeals found that Wiscon-
sin, rather than Texas, law governed the charitable immunity of a non-
profit aircraft association from plaintiff's quadriplegic injuries sustained
at an air show in Wisconsin.
20 3
195. Id. at *3-4, *11-12, *16-17.
196. 161 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
197. Id. at 63-64, 76.
198. 431 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2005).
199. Id. at 463-69.
200. No. Civ.A.3:03CV923-B, 2005 WL 39084 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2005).
201. Id. at *1-6.
202. Cabelka v. Herring Nat'l Bank, No. 7:04CV43R, 2005 WL 735035, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2005).
203. Doctor v. Pardue, 178 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005), with-
drawn, No. 01-03-00899-CV. 2005 WL 2234073 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 15,
2005, no pet. h.).
2006] 1067
SMU LAW REVIEW
3. Class Action Certifications
Class actions certified under the common-question-predominates stan-
dard of Texas and federal law require a showing that a common question
of law or fact predominates over disparate issues in the case.20 4 Trial
court certifications of multi-state or nationwide classes that fail to make a
record on this issue are now routinely reversed, as illustrated by four
cases during this Survey period. Two of these cases were reversed by the
Texas Supreme Court, one in an action against insurers for failing to re-
fund premiums collected on life insurance after termination of the child-
rider coverage, 205 and the other in an action by a Texas class of insurance
policy holders regarding insufficient dividends on company profits.
20 6
The same result was obtained in two courts of appeals rulings involving
computer purchases20 7 and real estate loans.
20 8
D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
1. Legislative Jurisdiction and Other Constitutional Limits on State
Choice-of-Law Rules
Similar to the due-process limitation on state long-arm statutes,20 9 the
United States Constitution also limits a state's ability to choose the gov-
erning law in its courts. However, unlike the limits on state long-arm
statutes (which arise only under the due-process clause), the choice-of-
law limits arise under several doctrines-due process (requiring a reason-
able connection between the dispute and the governing law), full faith
and credit (requiring the choice-of-law analysis to consider the interests
of other affected states), and, to a lesser extent, equal protection, privi-
leges and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause.
210
Constitutional problems most often occur when a state court chooses its
own law in questionable circumstances. But the inappropriate choice-of-
204. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (2006); TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3) (2005). See also
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 663 (Tex. 2004), in which the Texas
Supreme Court clarified the need for an appropriate choice-of-law analysis in certifying
multi-state class actions. Lapray is discussed in James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Con-
flict of Laws, 58 SMU L. REV. 679, 706-07 (2005).
205. Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2005) (attempted nationwide
class).
206. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 156 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2004). Plaintiffs
initially sought a nationwide class but amended to seek only a Texas-resident class. The
Texas Supreme Court did not necessarily reject the class; it only remanded for a more
rigorous analysis of the choice-of-law issues. Id. at 556-57.
207. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Albanese, 153 S.W.3d 254, 262 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2004, no pet. h.) (attempted nationwide class).
208. GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corp. v. Tex. Bay Oaks Ltd. P'ship, No. 05-04-
00899-CV, 2005 WL 2234596, at *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 24, 2005, no pet. h.) (at-
tempted nationwide class of borrowers).
209. See supra notes 18-25 and surrounding text.
210. See RESTATEMENT § 9 (1971) and comments following. See also SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 13, at 149-77; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648; James P. George, Choice of
Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833, 844-46 (1994). Choice of
law limits under full faith and credit are now questionable after Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003).
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forum law is not the only conceivable constitutional issue. For instance,
even when choosing foreign law, courts must apply choice-of-law rules
with an eye toward constitutional limitations. No cases during the Survey
period invoked these constitutional principles, but several cases discussed
in the class-action/choice of law section followed Lapray, a 2004 Texas
Supreme Court decision that was based on those principles.
211
2. False Conflicts
A false conflict exists either when other potentially-applicable laws are
the same as the forum law or when the laws reach the same result.212 In
conducting a choice-of-law analysis, the first step is to define a clear, out-
come-changing difference between the forum and the foreign law. Absent
a clear conflict, the forum law should apply.213 This Survey period pro-
duced five false-conflict cases with no complex opinions, unlike the prior
Survey period in which one court found a false conflict between the laws
of five states.214 The same plaintiff from that complex case-In re Senior
Living Properties L. L. C. Trust-had another false-conflict case reported
this year. Senior Living Properties L. L. C. Trust v. Clair Odell Insurance
Agency, L.L.C.215 involved a claim by the bankruptcy trustee for seventy-
three nursing homes against a management company, alleging that the
latter's misrepresentations led to insurance cancellations and bankruptcy.
The court found a false conflict because, while the defendants argued that
summary judgment was warranted under both Texas and Pennsylvania
law, the plaintiff failed to raise any affirmative argument under Penn-
sylvania law.216 Other false conflicts included an airline's indemnity
claim against a security company regarding a paraplegic passenger's in-
jury claim;217 a claim for attorney's fees in which the term "prevailing
party" had similar definitions under Massachusetts and Texas law;218 an
insurance-coverage claim against a bus company that had recently moved
211. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004), discussed in
James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 58 SMU L. REV. 679, 705 (2005). See
also supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text for the class-action-certification opinions
following Lapray.
212. This is the Restatement's definition of false conflict. See RESTATEMENT §§ 145
cmt. i, 186 cmt. c. Professor Brainerd Currie provides a very different concept of false
conflict-one in which only one state has a real interest. See ScoLES & HAY, supra note 13,
at 25-38. Unfortunately, Texas courts have used both definitions, as discussed in James P.
George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 56 SMU L. REV. 1283, 1335 n.396 (2003).
213. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823-45 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
214. See In re Senior Living Props. L.L.C. Trust, 309 B.R. 223, 233 (N.D. Tex. 2004),
reported in James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 58 SMU L. REV. 679,
702-03 (2005).
215. No. Civ.A.3:04-CV-0816-G, 2005 WL 1383359 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2005).
216. Id. at *1-2.
217. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. ARC Sec., Inc., 164 S.W.3d 666, 667 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2005, pet. denied).
218. Memon v. Baskin-Robbins Inc., No. Civ.A. H-03-1944, 2005 WL 1606930 (S.D.
Tex. July 6, 2005).
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from Wisconsin for a bus accident in Texas;219 and an indemnity claim
against Texas builders to collect on performance bonds in which the court
found no distinction between New Jersey and Texas law.
220
3. Notice and Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of another state's or nation's law must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister states' laws. 2 2 1 Foreign law, on the other hand, must be
adequately pleaded and proven.222 In Schaefer v. Bellfort Chateau
L.P.,223 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston discussed
the difference between the court's duty to take judicial notice of a sister
state's law and the proffering party's duty to demonstrate an actual con-
flict with Texas law. Plaintiff Bellfort Chateau sued Schaefer and his two
sons for fraudulent transfer. At trial, defendants moved for a directed
verdict on the grounds that, under California law, the trusts from which
the assets were transferred terminated automatically when the benefi-
ciaries reached eighteen years of age. After the plaintiff's objection for
not raising the foreign-law issues previously was overruled, the defend-
ants offered copies of the pertinent California code and cases. The trial
court denied the defendants' motion without stating whether California
or Texas law governed. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that, while
the court could take judicial notice of the content of California law, that
issue was distinct from deciding which state's law governed. The court
further held that if the defendants had not demonstrated a conflict be-
219. Republic W. Ins. Co. v. Rockmore, No. 3-02-CV-1569-K, 2005 WL 57284, at *5
(N.D. Tex. June 10, 2005).
220. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa. v. A-Unique Home Builders, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-04-
1154, 2005 WL 2044960, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2005).
221. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states' laws
on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must supply
"sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same under
federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S.
218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though FED. R. EVID. 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial notice) does
not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial-notice mandate for
American states' laws is subject to FED. R. EVID. 201(b). Under Rule 201(b), facts for
judicial notice must be "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Thus, federal courts may take judicial
notice of American states' laws from (1) official statutory and case reports, (2) widely used
unofficial versions, or (3) copies, all subject to evidentiary rules on authentication and best
evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
222. TEX. R. EVID. 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or other rea-
sonable notice at least thirty days before trial. The rule applies to all written materials and
sources offered as proof, including affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises, and any other
material source, whether or not submitted by a party and whether or not otherwise admis-
sible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. For non-English originals, parties must provide
copies of both the original and the English translation. Federal practice is similar. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
223. No. 14-04-00254-CV, 2005 WL 1981299 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 18,
2005, no pet. h.).
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tween Texas and California law, the court was entitled to presume that
they were the same.
2 24
The burden on the proponent of a claim under foreign law includes
adequate pleading of the foreign claim, as seen in Internet Corporativo
S.A. de C. V. v. Business Software Alliance, Inc. InterCorp is a Mexican
company that provides Internet and e-commerce services in Mexico and
certain Spanish-speaking areas of the United States.225 Microsoft Corpo-
ration and Business Software Alliance complained to a Mexican govern-
ment agency-the Mexican Institute of Intellectual Property-that
InterCorp was using unlicensed software. The Mexican agency decided in
InterCorp's favor. InterCorp then sued Microsoft and Business Alliance
in a federal court in Houston. In addition to various claims under United
States and Texas laws (including antitrust, tortious interference, and busi-
ness disparagement), InterCorp alleged that defendants had violated the
Mexican Commercial Code. Microsoft objected, arguing that InterCorp
had not pleaded any specific cause of action under Mexican law. In-
terCorp responded that it "simply invokes the applicable Mexican law,
should the Court find that Mexican law applies. ' 226 The court ruled in
favor of Microsoft, holding that, "to the extent that InterCorp is alleging
causes of action under the Commercial Code of Mexico, those claims
must be dismissed as inadequately pleaded. '227
4. Use of the Forum's Procedural Rules
Not only did InterCorp struggle with proving foreign law, but it also
struggled with the forum's procedural rules, as seen in a subsequent opin-
ion to InterCorp. In the first opinion noted above, the Houston federal
court dismissed not only InterCorp's claims under Mexican law, but also
dismissed its claims under United States federal and state laws for viola-
tion of the statute of limitations-InterCorp had waited more than four
years to sue.22 8 Although InterCorp had an opportunity to amend its
claims under Mexican law, it did not file an amended complaint before
the dismissal of all claims on November 15, 2004. Some time after the
dismissal, InterCorp filed a motion to reconsider and attached an
amended complaint reasserting the claim under Mexican law. InterCorp
argued that Mexico's law should govern the limitations period and that
under Mexican law, 229 the claim had a two-year limitation period that did
not commence until the Mexican government agency issued its ruling.
The court noted, however, that the forum's limitation period ordinarily
applies unless the claim is one that did not exist at common law. Since
the court found the Mexican law claim to be analogous to one at common
224. Id. at *3.
225. No. Civ.A. H-04-2322, 2004 WL 3331843 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2004).
226. Id. at *1, *12.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *14.
229. Internet Corporativo, S.A. de C.V. v. Bus. Software Alliance, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-
04-2322, 2005 WL 1155702, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2005).
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law, it rejected the Mexican limitation period. However, even if the Mex-
ican limitation period applied, the court stated that its two-year span was
expressly directed to "the date that the damage occurred." The applica-
tion of the forum's procedural rules also barred InterCorp in another
way-the plaintiff's argument following dismissal could not be raised by
an amended complaint, but only by reopening the case under Rule 59 or
Rule 60.230
Shirvanian v. DeFrates231 involved the gray area between substance
and procedure-the definition of litigant status. Plaintiffs were the trust-
ees of family trusts, which had investments in Waste Management, Inc., a
Delaware corporation. Waste Management's shareholders filed a deriva-
tive suit in Delaware state court; the suit settled in 2001 with explicit lan-
guage regarding its preclusive effect. The plaintiffs then brought an
action in Texas, but lost to the defendants' summary-judgment motion on
the preclusion issue. A Texas court of appeals reversed the summary
judgment and remanded for trial under Delaware law, finding that the
Shirvanians' suit was a direct action and not derivative. Pending a motion
for rehearing, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion in an unre-
lated case clarifying Delaware law on derivative suits. Based on this Del-
aware holding, the Texas court of appeals withdrew its earlier ruling and
affirmed the trial court's judgment for defendants. 232 Shirvanian thus is
an instance of both stare decisis (the Delaware clarification) and preclu-
sion (the Delaware action against Waste Management) in the same case.
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas con-
flict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Foreign judgments include those from
sister states and foreign countries but do not include federal court judg-
ments from districts outside Texas. Those judgments are enforced as lo-
cal federal-court judgments.233
A. ENFORCEMENT
Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: 1) the
common-law method using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local
lawsuit;23 4 and 2) since 1981, the more direct procedure under two uni-
form judgment acts and other similar acts for arbitration awards, child
custody, and child support. There were no instances of common-law en-
230. Id. at *24.
231. 161 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
232. Id. at 105-10.
233. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp. 2002).
234. The underlying mandate for common-law enforcement is the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory counter-
part, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act specif-
ically reserves the common-law method as an alternative to the Act. See TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 2005).
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forcement of sister-state judgments during the Survey period,235 but there
was one case involving a Hong Kong judgment not eligible for the Uni-
form Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act
("UFCMJRA").
1. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA") pro-
vides summary enforcement for non-Texas judgments that are entitled to
full faith and credit.236 This includes sister-state judgments as well as for-
eign-country money judgments that Texas recognizes under the UFCM-
JRA.237 The Survey period produced only one UEFJA case and no
UFCMJRA cases.
In Boyes v. Morris Polich & Purdy, L.L.P., 238 the El Paso Court of
Appeals had to consider whether to set aside a Nevada judgment based
on a post-answer default. The judgment debtor argued that Nevada
lacked jurisdiction. The El Paso Court of Appeals, however, found that
the Nevada court had jurisdiction, based both on a forum clause and on
defendant's having submitted himself to the Nevada court's jurisdiction.
In assessing the appropriateness of Nevada's jurisdiction, the Texas court
inexplicably engaged in a lengthy recitation of personal jurisdiction rules
235. Examples of common-law enforcement after the UEFJA's enactment include Mc-
Fadden v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 689 S.W.2d 330, 331-32 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985,
no writ); Cal Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse & Transfer Co., 687 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v. Rector, 710 S.W.2d 100,
103-07 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Escalona v. Combs, 712 S.W.2d 822, 823-
26 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211, 212
(Tex. 1985).
236. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.007 (Vernon 2005). The Act re-
quires (1) the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenticated under federal
or Texas law (§ 35.003); and (2) either the clerk (§ 35.004) or the judgment creditor
(§ 35.005) to provide notice to the judgment debtor. The judgment debtor may (1) move
to stay enforcement if grounds exist under Texas law or the rendering state (§ 35.006); or
(2) challenge enforcement along traditional full faith and credit grounds such as the ren-
dering state's lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction (§ 35.003).
237. Tx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-.008 (Vernon 2005). Like the
UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment creditor to file a copy of the foreign-coun-
try judgment that has been authenticated under federal or Texas law (§ 36.0041) and either
the clerk (§ 36.0042) or the creditor (§ 36.0043) to provide notice to the debtor. The judg-
ment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement, unless he is domiciled in a foreign
country, in which case he has sixty days and a twenty-day extension available for good
cause. Id. § 36.0044. Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA explicitly states ten grounds for
non-recognition-three mandatory and seven discretionary. Briefly stated, the mandatory
grounds are (1) lack of an impartial tribunal, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (3) lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. § 36.005(a). The court may grant discretionary non-rec-
ognition if the foreign action (1) involved inadequate notice, (2) was obtained by fraud, (3)
violates Texas public policy, (4) is contrary to another final judgment, (5) is contrary to the
parties' agreement (e.g., a contrary forum-selection clause), (6) was in an inconvenient
forum, or (7) is not from a country granting reciprocal enforcement rights. Id. § 36.005(b).
The UFCMJRA also provides for stays (§ 36.007) and expressly reserves the right of en-
forcement of non-money judgments under traditional, non-statutory standards (§ 36.008).
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (comity as discretionary grounds for recog-
nizing and enforcing foreign-country judgments).
238. 169 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet. h.).
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under Texas law and then analyzed the defendant's amenability to Ne-
vada jurisdiction under Texas law.
23 9
2. Common-Law Enforcement
As noted above, the common law provides a basis for sister-state judg-
ment enforcement even in the absence of the UEFJA. The common-law
remedy for enforcing foreign-country judgments is comity and preclusion.
One of these rare cases occurred during the Survey period, Siko Ventures
Ltd. v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C.240 Siko is a British Virgin Islands corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Hong Kong; Argyll is a Texas-
based lender. As security for a loan, Siko transferred to Argyll fifty mil-
lion shares of its stock in Kanstar Environmental Technologies. How-
ever, Argyll allegedly failed to follow through on the loan and sold the
shares of pledged stock. Thus, Siko obtained an injunction from a Hong
Kong court, which forbade Argyll to sell additional shares of Kanstar
stock and required Argyll to return the remaining stock and the proceeds.
Siko then sought enforcement of the injunction in Texas. Argyll raised
three objections: this was not a money judgment, the Hong Kong court
lacked personal jurisdiction, and the Hong Kong judgment was contrary
to a Texas choice-of-forum clause in the parties' agreement.
2 41
The court first noted that this could be a case of first impression-the
domestication of a foreign-country injunction. The court then noted the
express language of the Texas UFCMJRA, which states that it "does not
prevent the recognition of a foreign country judgment in a situation not
covered by this chapter. '242 Also, although there were no Texas cases
supporting Siko's effort, the court found sufficient persuasion in cases en-
forcing sister-state injunctions. Thus, the court enforced the injunction,
rejecting Argyll's other objections to jurisdiction because they had been
litigated and decided in the Hong Kong action.
243
3. Judgments against Sovereigns
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") 244 regulates judg-
ment enforcement against the assets of sovereign governments. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued two opinions during the Survey period
related to FSIA-Walker 245 and Walker 12 46-which involved claims
against the Republic of Congo ("ROC"). The foreign judgment
originated in an arbitral award of $26,093,251 from the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris. The judgment was upheld by a French
court and then registered as a foreign judgment in the District of Colum-
239. Id. at 455-59.
240. No. SA-05-CA-100-OG, 2005 WL 2233205 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005).
241. Id. at *1.
242. Id. (quoting TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.008 (Vernon 2005)).
243. Id. at *24.
244. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-11 (West 2005).
245. Walker Int'l Holdings, Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 395 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2004).
246. Walker Int'l Holdings, Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 415 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2005).
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bia. Using the D.C. judgment, Walker filed a garnishment action in the
Southern District of Texas seeking money owed to ROC by Murphy Ex-
ploration & Production, International. In Walker I, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denial of garnishment, finding that (1) Murphy,
as garnishee, could raise an FSIA defense as FSIA defenses are not lim-
ited to sovereign parties; (2) ROC waived immunity in its arbitration
agreement and that waiver controlled here; and (3) the garnished prop-
erty, though intangible, was located in Texas for purposes of judgment
enforcement. However, in spite of all this, the court held that the immu-
nity waiver was inoperative because the garnished property was not being
used in a commercial activity, a necessary predicate for the immunity
waiver to be operative. 247 In Walker II, the court of appeals upheld the
federal magistrate judge's award of attorney's fees to Murphy for defend-
ing the garnishment action.
248
4. Arbitration Enforcement
Foreign arbitration awards may be enforced in Texas under federal and
state law.2
49
The Survey period produced no cases involving the direct recognition
of a foreign arbitral award in a Texas court. But Walker I, discussed im-
mediately above, was based on an ICC arbitral award that was first recog-
nized in the District of Columbia.250
5. Family-Law Judgments
Texas laws also provide for recognition and enforcement of sister-state
and foreign-country child-custody judgments under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") 251 and child-sup-
port judgments under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
("UIFSA"). 252 The custody cases under the UCCJEA often overlap with
jurisdictional issues and are discussed in the jurisdiction section.253 The
Survey period produced one interstate support case.
In re T.J.254 enforced a Michigan child-support arrearage order in
Texas and illustrated how procedurally awkward interstate support col-
lection can be. In 1974, Peggy and Jordan Jones obtained a divorce in
Macomb County, Michigan. Under the terms of the divorce decree, Jor-
dan was ordered to pay child support for the couple's minor child, T.J.
Jordan failed to pay and moved to Texas. Texas obtained an arrearage
order under the Texas Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
247. Walker Int'l, 395 F.3d at 233-37.
248. Walker Int'l, 415 F.3d at 419.
249. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005); Texas International Arbi-
tration Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (Vernon 2005).
250. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
251. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.001-.317 (Vernon 2002).
252. See id. §§ 159.001-.902 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
253. See supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
254. No. 12-03-00331-CV, 2005 WL 588875 (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 14,2005, no pet. h.).
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Act 255 in 1983 and initiated a proceeding to enforce the 1983 order in
1988. In the 1988 proceeding, the trial court entered judgment, including
the unpaid portion of the arrearage from the 1983 order and the addi-
tional arrearage incurred between 1983 and 1988. On May 6, 1991, the
Texas attorney general filed a Release of Judgment Lien, stating that the
parties had settled the 1988 judgment and that the State of Texas released
and discharged the lien created by the judgment. In a letter dated May
22, 1991, a Michigan Friend of the Court (functioning not as amicus but as
a guardian ad litem) acknowledged the Texas release of lien but informed
Jordan that he still owed $5,536.89, the difference between the Michigan
arrearage and what the Texas order had discharged.
25 6
In January of 2002, the State of Michigan registered an authenticated
and certified copy of an arrearage order with Texas (the "2001 order"),
stating that Jordan owed over $9,000 for unpaid child support and service
fees. Jordan contested registration of the 2001 order, arguing that the
alleged child support owed was from before 1984, that a support order
was entered and payments had been made for that time period under the
1983 Texas order, and that a Release of Judgment Lien had been filed.
At hearings in October and June, the trial court sustained Jordan's con-
test to registration of the 2001 Michigan order. On appeal, the court re-
versed and rendered. The court concluded that Jordan failed to
overcome the presumption that the 2001 order was valid and failed to
establish any defense to the registration contest under section 159.607(a)
of the Texas Family Code.2
57
B. PRECLUSION
Both sister-state and foreign-country judgments are entitled to preclu-
sive effect in Texas courts. The full faith and credit clause compels full
faith and credit for valid and final sister-state judgments involving the
same parties and claims; it also compels collateral estoppel if the required
elements are satisfied. 258 Under the doctrine of comity, foreign-country
judgments may also be given res judicata and preclusive effect, subject to
discretion based on the nature of the foreign proceeding and the satisfac-
tion of traditional preclusion requirements. 259
1. Interstate Preclusion
As discussed in a prior section of this Article, the court in Shirvanian v.
DeFrates260 reversed itself on the issue of whether plaintiffs were barred
in their Texas action by an earlier shareholders' derivative suit in Dela-
255. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is the current version of the Act. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159.001-.901 (1995).
256. In re TI., 2005 WL 588875, at *1.
257. Id. at *5-8.
258. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948). See WEINTRAUB, supra
note 1, at 701-02.
259. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 13, at 1268.
260. 161 S.W.3d 102, 111 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
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ware. The Texas court originally ruled that the Texas plaintiffs-the
Shirvanians-brought a direct action rather than a derivative one, but
changed its mind when an unrelated Delaware Supreme Court opinion
clarified derivative actions under Delaware law. The Texas court granted
stare decisis to the Delaware opinion, ruling that the Delaware definition
of derivative action controlled because all parties agreed that Delaware
law governed the suit.261 However, rules of preclusion and full faith and
credit also required this result. Under the rules of preclusion and full
faith and credit, the court was required to give the Delaware decision
involving Waste Management the same effect that it would be given by a
Delaware court.262 The Shirvanian dismissal was compelled regardless of
whether the parties in the Texas case agreed that Delaware law
controlled.
2. International Preclusion
In re Offshore Financial Corp.2 6 3 wins this year's award for the most
difficult case to explain in a short space and involves parties to cases that
won the award in past Surveys. In 1999, Milo Segner (bankruptcy trustee
for Offshore Financial) obtained a judgment in a bankruptcy court in
Dallas against 80451 Holdings, Ltd., a Canadian company. The judgment
remained unenforceable because of 80451's problems, including a Cana-
dian lawsuit resembling a receivership. Segner, learning that 80451 had
obtained a Mexican judgment against several parties in 1996, filed a turn-
over order in the Dallas bankruptcy court. This order asked the court to
order 80451 to surrender its ownership of the Mexican judgment. Had
this turnover motion been successful, it would not have been an enforce-
ment of the Mexican judgment. Rather, it would have given preclusive
effect to the Mexican court's decision that 80451 had a property interest
capable of seizure.
264
Attorneys for 80451 objected to the turnover motion on the grounds
that (1) its own Mexican judgment was fraudulently obtained (this appar-
ent admission against interest may be explained by the fact that 80451
had come under different management in light of the Canadian lawsuit);
and (2) the Dallas bankruptcy court should abstain in deference to the
receiver-type action in Canada. 265 The bankruptcy court did not abstain,
holding that 80451 had not met its burden of showing that the Canadian
261. Id. at 105-10.
262. See Purcell v. Bellinger, 940 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1997). For a discussion of the
outer limits of this rule, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 372-87
(1996) (Delaware state court class-action settlement/judgment entitled to full faith and
credit in a California federal class action, even though the claims released in the Delaware
action were within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts).
263. 319 B.R. 845 (N.D. Tex. 2005). See James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of
Laws, 56 SMU L. REv. 1283, 1300 (2002) (discussing Brousseau v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet. denied)). Brousseau and Ranzau were involved in both
that case and this case.
264. In re Offshore, 319 B.R. at 846-47.
265. Id. at 846-47.
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court had obtained exclusive in rem jurisdiction over 80451's assets.266
However, the court agreed with 80451's first objection, finding that
Segner had not shown that 80451 owned a valid and enforceable Mexican
judgment. In fact, the Beaumont Court of Appeals ruled in 2002 that this
same Mexican judgment was inappropriately obtained in violation of ear-
lier bankruptcy orders.267 Although Segner was not a party to the case in
front of the Beaumont court and thus was not bound by that decision, the
Beaumont court was persuasive in showing that the Mexican judgment
was invalid. The Dallas bankruptcy court accordingly denied Segner's
turnover motion.2
68
266. Id. at 850-51.
267. Id. at 849 (discussing Brosseau, 81 S.W.3d at 381).
268. Id. at 848-50.
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